Cook County Public Defenders Blog

In a closely balanced drug case, where the defense argued  that it was unconscionable that the State had failed to have certain items tested for fingerprints, the 4th District Appellate court stated that the defense can never open the door so as to shift the burden of proof, and therefore, the State’s rebuttal argument that it was unconscionable for the defense not to have submitted the fingerprints for analysis, was reversible error. ”Further, by overruling defendant’s objections to these type of comments by the State, the trial court was in effect sanctioning an erroneous burden of proof before the eyes of the jury,”  Justice Cook wrote.  People v. Aaron Beasley, 4th District, 8/22/08.   B. E. M.

In a 2-1 decision by our Appellate Court in People v McLaurin, 2008 Ill. App. LEXIS 426, the court reversed Mr McLaurin’s  conviction when he was excluded from discussions among the lawyers and judge about  five jury notes and when the trial court directed the sheriff to have an ex-parte discussion with the jurors by telling them to continue to deliberate.

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 Scalia opinion invalidated the hangun ban and trigger lock requirement enacted in Washington D.C.  Read the case by clicking this.  Then discuss.

MORE WORK FOR US

The Supreme Court of the United States just made more work for us by deciding on 6/19/08, in Indiana v Edwards, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5031, that a defendant may be fit for trial but not fit to exercise the right to self representation under Faretta v California, 422 U.S.806.  Given that most of our judges despise pro-se trials, it is likely that this ruling will lead to court ordered BCX evaluations on the issues of  fitness and  fitness to exercise the right of self representation, and then the appointment of the PD.   Interesting legal and professional/ethical problems will arise during these proceedings; to wit, what should counsel’s position on these issues be?  Should we object to the appointment of counsel to preserve the defendant’s Faretta rights?  Management probably needs to develop some policies on this which we can look forward to in a couple of years. In the meantime…well that’s why they pay us the big bucks.

Many prosecutors and judges seem to think that Public Act 095-0134 aka 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(v), effective 8/13/07, requires that a defendant serve 75% time for Class X Drug cases. Not So!!!  A careful reading of the statute by some of our brothers and sisters and a call to IDOC Legal Counsel by brother David Will reveals that only those Class X offenses where the substance is 100 grams or more require 75% time. Use your professional judgment on how to use this information.

Day Reporting Time Counts!The Illinois Supreme Court affirms the Appellate Courts’ decision in  People v Beachem, 374 Ill App 3d 145, that our clients are entitled to time credit for days spent in the sheriff’s day reporting program. (No. 104976 5/22/08). Read a pdf version of the opinion as posted on the Supreme Court Website by clicking here. 

After arresting the driver of a car the police may search that car….or maybe not. In Arizona v Grant,  2007 Ariz. LEXIS 73 the usually pro state Arizona Supreme Court said the following.”This case requires us to determine whether the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement permits the warrantless search of an arrestee’s car when the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, seated in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of a police officer. We hold that in such circumstances, a warrantless search is not justified.”Not surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiori at 2008 U. S. LEXIS 2022. Until such time as the U.S. Supreme Court explains how the Arizona court’s clear reasoning is in error, members should raise this issue in car search cases.

Per People v Diggins, 2008 Ill App. LEXIS 195, the Third District Appellate Court ruled on March 11, 2008, that  the center console of a vehicle constitutes a case for the “enclosed in a case exception” to the Aggravated UUW statute. “ Allowing drivers to hide weapons anywhere in the vehicle, so long as the case is portable, while prohibiting the storage of such weapon in a glove box or center console {is} absurd, illogical and unjust.” In Diggins there was a factual dispute as to whether the console was locked or open and the court thus remanded for a new trial rather than reversing the conviction outright.  

As a result of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Wagener, 196 Ill.2d 269, 752 N.E.2d 430 (2001) we thought the attempt to apply Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) to consecutive sentences was dead. But maybe not!!!  On March 17, 2008 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Oregon v. Ice,  2008 U.S. LEXIS 2387 to decide the issue of whether the Sixth Amendment requires that facts (other than prior convictions) necessary to imposing consecutive sentences be found by the jury or admitted by the defendant. Members involved in cases involving consecutive sentencing situations should raise the issue and check out the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision on which cert was granted at State v Ice, 2007 Ore. LEXIS 815 (2007).

As a reminder, it is reversible error in a DNA case for the judge to permit the prosecution, over the objection of the defense, to introduce any evidence that the defendant’s DNA profile was in a DNA database. People v. Jackson, 865 N.E.2d 195 (1st Dist. 2007).  This situation comes up mostly in cold-hit cases, where the prosecution seeks to inform the jury that a database hit to the defendant’s profile occurred.  According to the First District Appellate Court, it is error to admit reference to the database.